CONTEMPT OF COURT PROCEEDINGS-1942       A somewhat difficult and awkward situation arose out of the appeal of one P. D. Shamdasani to the Privy Council, against the order of committal for contempt passed by Mr. Justice Kania in 1942.  Shamdasani was an inveterate litigant; and he almost always conducted his cases in person, seldom engaging a counsel or a solicitor.  As a lay lawyer, he was as painstaking as pertinacious, and used to argue his case, particularly in its legal aspects, with ability, but with such particularity and prolixity, that he drove most judges and magistrates into despair, by the length and persistence of his arguments.  He also at times overstepped the limits of legitimate advocacy.  As a layman appearing in person, most courts accorded him a long rope longer than would be conceded to any advocate amenable to the discipline of the court.  Shamdasani frequently abused this indulgence.  He was generally so irrepressible that he had made of himself a thorough nuisance to the courts on frequent occasions.       The contempt proceedings before Kania J. arose out of a rude remark which he had made as regards the Bar in general, implying an insinuation against the methods of the Bar.  The counsel opposing him took exception to this remark and called the attention of the court to the same.  The judge it would seem somewhat impulsively committed him for contempt of court and ordered him to undergo three months: imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000.  The sentence of imprisonment was subsequently reduced to one week.       The facts were briefly as follows:       In an action brought by Shamdasani against the Central Bank of India Ltd. (the Bank was the bete noire of Shamdasani, and he repeatedly dragged it into court, it was alleged with ulterior motives), a summons concerning taxation of costs came on before Kania J. Shamdasani as usual appeared in person.  M. V. Desai, Bar-at-Law, appeared for the respondents.  At the hearing in October 1942, Shamdasani made two offensive remarks, one about the Bar generally and the other about the Taxing Master.  It appears that having made the remarks, on counsel's protest he expressed regret and tendered an apology; and perhaps it would have been better to have left the matter there.  However, at the conclusion of the arguments, an application was made by M. V. Desai, supported by the Advocate-General on behalf of the Bar, against Shamdasani, to show cause why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court.  He was heard the following day, when Kania J. committed him to prison as stated above.  The sentence of imprisonment was subsequently reduced to one week on his applying through his counsel M. C. Setalvad, pleading excitement through ill health and tendering an unconditional apology to the court.   On his release from jail, Shamdasani presented a petition for leave to appeal to the Privy Council, which was heard by Beaumont C.J. and Sen J.  It was lucky for Shamdasani that the matter came up before Beaumont.  The Chief Justice had a singularly quick and decisive mind.  He seldom if ever reserved a judgment; and almost invariably proceeded to dictate judgments on the spot, as soon as counsel had finished, even in protracted and complicated cases.       He applied under Clause 41 of the Letters Patent for a certificate declaring that the case was a fit one for appeal to the Privy Council.  On this, the Chief Justice, in a rather emphatic judgment, observed that the first question to be dealt with was, whether this court had jurisdiction under Clause 41 to make the declaration asked for.  He referred to a case in which the Privy Council had expressed the view, that such an order of committal for contempt was an order of a criminal or quasi-criminal nature; and accordingly His Majesty in Council had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal.  In view of this ruling, the Chief Justice held that such interferences, when they amount to contempt of court, are quasi-criminal; and orders punishing a party in contempt should, generally speaking, be treated as orders in a criminal matter.  But leave to appeal against them should be granted only on the well-settled principles on which leave to appeal to the Privy Council in criminal cases is given.  The Chief Justice further observed:   "The Privy Council has, of course, laid down on many occasions that they will not entertain appeals in criminal matters, merely because they may think that the decision is wrong.  They will only entertain such appeals if there has been some serious miscarriage of justice.  They exercised a jurisdiction which in India we would call revisional, rather than appellate.  In this case, it seems to me that before we should be justified in granting a certificate, we must be satisfied that the applicant was not in contempt at the time when the court pronounced sentence upon him.   If he was in contempt, then the fact that the punishment may have been, in our view, more severe than the circumstances justified, would not afford a proper ground for expressing the opinion that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Privy Council.  But if we are of the opinion that the applicant was not in contempt at all, then it seems to me that there has been a miscarriage of justice of a character in which the Privy Council may properly be asked to interfere."       As regards the reflection cast upon the Bar generally by the applicant, which Kania J. held to amount to contempt of court, the Chief Justice observed: "I cannot help thinking that the counsel appearing against Shamdasani had moved the court to take action, supported by the Advocate-General on behalf of the Bar; in that action, the Bar displayed a somewhat undue degree of sensitiveness.  After all, the charges by laymen that the Bar is in the habit of misrepresenting facts, that they assert that a client has a just cause when they know it to be unjust, or that he is innocent of the offence charged when they know him to be guilty, are as old as the profession itself.  More than 200 years ago, Swift described the Bar as 'a society of men bred up from their youth in the art of proving by words multiplied for the purpose, that white is black and black is white, according as they are paid.'  That sort of charge is entirely untrue.  The Bar do not state facts; it is contrary to the ethics of the profession to do so.  They do not allege that black is white; the most they do is to submit that there is no evidence to show that black is not white.  Every judge knows how much he owes to the assistance of counsel, and how greatly it helps in arriving at a just conclusion.   Naturally, these professional men put forward the view of their own clients.  But it seems to me rather late in the day for the Bar suddenly to display consternation, at finding that there are people who think that the principal purpose of an advocate is to throw dust in the eyes of the court.  This sort of charges never have, as far as I know, disturbed the morale of the Bar or affected its prosperity."  Proceeding further, the Chief Justice observed:  "I do not think, there was any attack upon an individual counsel; and the grounds on which the learned judge based his order seem to me to be open to two criticisms.  In the first place, I think, he attached too much importance to the opinion of Mr. Shamdasani.  He is not a member of the Bar, and he has no inside knowledge as to the ethics of the barrister's profession; and even if he had adhered to his opinion that members of the Bar are in the habit of misleading the court, I do not think, it would have had the slightest effect on the administration of justice.  The other criticism is that the learned judge entirely ignored the fact that this charge was withdrawn at the earliest moment.  How an expression of an opinion by a layman that the Bar misleads the court, immediately retracted, can be said to interfere with the administration of justice, or shake the confidence of the public in it, I must confess, I am at a loss to understand."       Proceeding in his judgment, the Chief Justice referred to the other ground of contempt on which the judge relied, viz., that the Taxing Master had stated at the end of his certificate that he had "considered all the matters mentioned in Rule 563 ", and the applicant had stated, "it is customary for the Taxing Master to write what is written at the end of the para -but is it considered at all ?"  "I am unable to see how that statement can be construed as contempt of court."  The Chief Justice concluded by saying that, "in the view I take of this case, the applicant was not really in contempt.  That being so, the order passed upon him was, in my view, without jurisdiction; and on that ground I think, the case is a proper one for appeal to the P.C."  He further pointed out that "at present the tendency of modern decisions has been to restrict rather than to enlarge the class of cases in which proceedings for contempt can be taken; and it seems to me that if the learned judge's view is right, its effect would be to enlarge considerably such class of cases.  On these grounds, leave should be granted'.  Sen J. agreed.  The Court also dispensed with the deposit usually required from an appellant to the Privy Council.       In the appeal, Shamdasani had made the Chief Justice and the judges of the High Court of Bombay respondents; and they were brought on the record.  The Chief Justice, while dispensing with the deposit, observed that the judges would not appear in the appeal.  The legal adviser to the Secretary of State (Sir Kenneth Kemp), however, was of the view that the action taken by one of the judges of the High Court should not be allowed to go by default in the Privy Council.  In his opinion, in the first place, it would be discourteous to the Privy Council.  It would also produce a wrong impression locally, viz., that the Chief Justice and the judges did not defend the order of Kania J. owing to a divergence of views amongst themselves.  Thirdly, an important matter of principle was involved in the matter, which required to be cleared up once and for all.  Sir Kenneth Kemp was of the view that it was wrong in cases of this nature, to make the judges of the High Court respondents; and this appears to have been the view of the Chief Justice also.  The proper respondent to the appeal ought to be the Crown; and he suggested that an application should be made to the Privy Council to amend the proceedings by substituting the Crown in place of the Chief Justice and judges of the High Court.  It was obviously wrong that judges should be placed in a position of having to pay or receive costs from a litigant, on such an application as this.  If it is suggested that the judges might have to pay costs out of their own pockets, this would be a serious invasion upon judicial independence and privilege.  If, on the other hand, it is conceded that such costs should be paid or received by the Crown, there is no reason why the ordinary procedure should not be adopted of making the Crown respondent.  A further anomaly was also pointed out, viz., that unless the Chief Justice and judges were to be regarded as a sort of  'corporation sole'  (which they were not), their composition being liable to change, as indeed was the fact in this very case, there being now a new Chief Justice and three new judges since the date of the committal for contempt, the position would be quite anomalous.       The High Court agreed with the views expressed by the India office, and an application was made to amend the proceedings before the Privy Council by substituting the Crown, or the King Emperor, in place of the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court of Bombay as respondents.  Counsel for Shamdasani seems to have applied that at least Kania J. who made the order should also be made a respondent.  The Privy Council ruled that, although there may be cases in which it may be proper to join as respondent the judge who made the order of committal, they refused to make the order in this particular case.       The Privy Council heard the appeal and agreeing with the views of Beaumont C.J. they allowed the appeal with costs.       This matter had a rather curious sequel.  In disposing of the application, the Privy Council inter alia had observed: "It was a matter of some surprise to Their Lordships that, in spite of the emphatic opinion of the Chief Justice and another judge of the court of which the appellant was alleged to be in contempt, that no contempt had been committed, the executive should have deemed it necessary, not only to appear but to have endeavoured to uphold the order."  In view of this remark, the Government of Bombay, by their letter dated 29th June 1945, addressed to the Registrar of the High Court, referring to the passage in the judgment of the Privy Council just cited, stated: "When the Crown was substituted as the respondent for the Chief Justice and judges, Government accepted the Justices' proposal to defend the appeal.  The defence by Government, which was undertaken purely out of courtesy to the Privy Council and to the High Court, has led to a severe stricture by the Privy Council.  I am to request you to inform the Honourable the Chief Justice and judges that as the Privy Council holds the executive responsible for the decision to defend the appeal before it, Government regrets that it will not be able to defend them as a matter of course, but it will exercise its own discretion in each case."       The High Court replied: "Their Lordships regret that the action of Government in entertaining a defence has been followed by some remarks in the judgment of the Privy Council, which might be construed to reflect upon the propriety of that action.  Their Lordships appreciate that Government was actuated by the feeling that it would be discourteous both to the Privy Council and to the High Court to allow a matter affecting the dignity of this court to go unsupported.  They venture to hope that this feeling will be the sole consideration to influence Government, if further cases of this or similar nature should arise.  Their Lordships desire to point out that cases of this kind are very rare; and they believe, this was the first occasion when Government had to appear in a contempt matter to support the view of this High Court.  A divergence of views does not necessarily mean that the feeling of Government to support the judgment was wrong.  While appreciating that, if the Government is to pay for its action, it should have a voice in the matter, Their Lordships trust that, as heretofore, in matters of this kind, Government will be guided by the views of the High Court, and will not on a prejudgment on an issue, alter its policy, which has been accepted so far before this unusual incident."       Another sequel of an unusual character also followed due to Mr. Shamdasani's style of advocacy.  He addressed the Board in person at a late stage of the proceedings; and with his customary contumacy and pertinacity wearied Their Lordships who repeatedly requested him to close and sit down.  Knowing that the judicial Committee of the Privy Council was not a law court in the strict sense, but only an advisory body, and had as such no power to commit for contempt of court, Shamdasani defied their orders and continued speaking, until, through sheer desperation, Their Lordships rose in a body and walked out.  The appellant's behaviour at the end provided an object lesson of the manners and methods which drove Kania J. to make his precipitate and unfortunate order of committal.   * * * * *